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I. Introduction 
The Great Recession that has begun with 2007-2009 U.S. subprime mortgage crisis appeared to be 
unexpected by most of the world economic society like all the previous crises [1], spurring again 
interest for crisis management. And while one could think of how to predict the unpredictable, another 
approach [2] would focus on how to make failures unpredictable by their own nature to be less 
harmful. А failure of one component of the complex system, like an economic one, could lead to the 
failure of many other components in a domino effect fashion. In this work, we will discuss the 
theoretical foundations for designing a banking system less exposed to such events also considering 
economic growth. The desired effect would be a decrease in a failure cascade size, decrease of a 
probability of any bank to fail and the minimal decrease in output growth and consumption. 
Arthur Cecil Pigou, an English economist, has developed a concept of externality [3] – cost or benefit 
affecting third parties. The most popular and illustrative example is environmental pollution, e.g. of 
air. Factories ejecting poisonous smoke produce more than they would do in case if they should have 
paid for all the harm caused to local people breathing polluted air. Other negative externalities (i.e. 
incurring not benefits but costs) examples are noise pollution, common property resources misuse, 
passive smoking, antibiotic resistance etc. Pigou proposed to levy taxes on the negative externalities 
producing actions in order to gauge social damage. This kind of taxation is called a Pigouvian tax. 
An externality that is less obvious is the systemic risk incurred by the actions of banks. Every new 
transaction changes the interconnectedness of the assets (credits, CDSs, equity etc.) networks 
potentially exposing third parties to the defaults. The first problem is that the risk might be not 
embodied and the second is that there are different ways to measure the systemic risk. This is actually 
what this work would be dedicated to. 
Another currently used alternative that was proposed by James Tobin (for a slightly different purpose 
though [4]) is taxation based on the volume of tax. It is much easier to calculate; however, its 
effectiveness is under dispute. We will discuss it too. 
Summarizing, this work is dedicated to the Pigouvian tax applied to the banking system in order to 
decrease systemic risk. This idea was proposed with the DebtRank [5] in [6]. DebtRank is the systemic 
risk measure, denoting the fraction of the system’s assets being exposed to the failure of the certain 
pool of institutions.  
We model the economy in an agent-based fashion and try different systemic risk metrics. The reader 
can think of the agent-based modelling as a videogame development: different economic agents and 
the interaction between them are introduced, and then the economy is simulated. The economic agents 
behave as defined: give credits to each other, pay them back, sell and buy goods. The most important 
reason for the choice of agent-based modelling is that this fashion allows modeling very complex 
scenarios, what is done in this thesis. We also discuss other extensions of this model. 
Network-based risk metrics and thus a tax on some of them involve the calculation all of the network 
nodes; in other words, this tax is based not only on the acting agent behaviour but also on the other 
agents’ behaviour. Without taking into account technical difficulties in the real-world implementation, 
like computing these metrics for every transaction (one has to know all the up-to-date data on the 
obligations for all the financial institutions), we consider a legal issue: one usually cannot be taxed 
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based on others behaviour. For this purpose, we introduce the truncated version of the original 
DebtRank and tested it. 
As a result of this thesis, we obtained, that for the purpose of systemic risk tax different DebtRank 
versions work the best. We can generalize, that only metrics specially developed for measuring 
different systemic losses in response to the system’s distress would work. Another metric, SinkRank, 
performed much worse and has demonstrated to be unsuitable for this purpose. 2-step DebtRank 
(that we suppose to be legal) introduced in this thesis, appeared to perform quite well; however, we 
think, that more investigation in this field is needed.  
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II. Background 
This thesis is based on the paper [6], where authors introduce the systemic risk tax. Systemic risk tax 
is the tax levied on the systemic risk externality, and that is why authors call it Pigouvian. Every new 
transaction changes the systemic risk in the entire economy, and in order to manage it, authors propose 
to tax more risky transactions. They model it in an agent-based fashion and measure risk using the 
DebtRank (III.B.ii), [5]. This research is very interesting in the paradigm of the systemic risk 
management whipped up by the recent Great recession led to big alterations in the regulation of the 
financial world, like Basel III framework [7]. Instead of tightening remedies, like greater capital 
requirements to the systemically important institutions, authors propose a “smart tax”, which is much 
smaller than the traditional Tobin tax, affects the economic activity the same way and stimulates 
economic agents to create much more robust and default-proof system. One of the aims of this 
research, however, not looking feasible to implement, is to begin the discussion of hypothetical 
methods to decrease systemic risks via economic policy.  
We continue this research, describing the economy considered in the same fashion, introducing 
taxation rates based on some other systemic risk measures, and observe the simulated economy 
evolution. We will consider how long the system lives before the failure, the amount of assets lost due 
to the catastrophe and number of banks defaults caused by the first failure. 
A. Systemic risk measures 
Systemic risk is usually defined as a risk of the entire system to collapse; it is opposed to individual, 
idiosyncratic risk. The central idea of paper [6], on which this thesis is based, is to separate default risk 
from contagion risk. Default contagion is an event of a default being propagated from one institution 
to the other. So, the default is an idiosyncratic event, and contagion is a systemic one. In our thesis, 
we compare systemic risk metrics as the means for managing systemic risk while basing the tax rate 
on these metrics. 
So, there are two main paradigms on how to measure this systemic risk exposure caused by any 
institution. First is “too big to fail” – idea, that some institutions are so large, that their failure would 
cause a significant domino effect and lead to many consequent failures. The second paradigm – “too 
interconnected to fail” – is similar, but in this case, the interconnectedness is considered to be a 
systemic risk factor. We will consider the second one. Let us consider the components of our model 
and their interaction in detail. 
In the [8] paper, there are 5 different models (Eisenberg-Noe, Rogers-Veraart, Default Cascades, 
original DebtRank and cyclic Debtrank) for systemic risk calculation are presented, compared and 
discussed. Based on the balance sheets equations, these models differ in assumptions: e.g., DebtRanks 
are the only models there implemented with mark-to-market valuation (it is their advantage), and 
Rogers-Veraart differs from Eisenberg-Noe model only by bankruptcy costs. We do not consider the 
first three models, because it is proved that these models underestimate systemic risk compared to 
DebtRank models. All these models can be interpreted as a re-evaluation of the interbank claims [9]. 
First two models, unlike the latter ones, were initially introduced as clearing payment mechanisms for 
the banks networks with defaults, however, they also might be used for stress-testing [10]. All these 
models define the amount of assets exposed to the initial distress (which is defined here as a default 
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of a certain institution). Based on this value, one can rank the institutions by the systemic risk they 
bring in the interbank network. 
SinkRank systemic risk measure [11] also considered in this thesis is very different from these 5 
models. Initially, it was developed for the interbank payments networks. Being more abstract, it 
denotes the inverse average number of steps in a random walk until the defaulted institution. 
B. Agent-based approach 
i. Motivation 
The core motive of this thesis is the application of different systemic risk metrics for taxation in order 
to check the robustness of the system and consider the growth-sustainability trade-off. Traditional 
economic modelling approach (econometric models, considering “representative” agents or/and 
aggregated macroeconomic variables) would barely work here because of the following reasons:  
▪ Systemic risk measures are too complicated for the analytical inference; 
▪ The considered problem is focused on rare (tail) but destructive events;  
▪ Lucas critique; 
We confine the tail events discussion to the following quote: 
Much of the real world is controlled as much by the “tails” of the distributions as by means or 
averages: by the exceptional, not the mean; by the catastrophe, not the steady drip; by the very rich, 
not the “middle class”. We need to free ourselves from “average” thinking. [12] 
Concerning the last pitfall of the analytical approach, Lucas critique [13] of the traditional economic 
modelling blames it on that any economic policy based on the historical data relationships observation 
is naïve because the economic policy itself will affect economic agents’ motivation thus probably 
leading to quite different results. This critique whipped up the discussion in an economic society and 
led to the idea of microfoundations, i.e., the individual behaviour description for the macro-
perspective modelling. While our research is focused on changing this individual behaviour via 
taxation policy, this critique is relevant more than ever. 
As an attempt to solve this issue, agent-based modelling was proposed. We also selected it for our 
purpose.  
The model used is the one described in the book [14]. The model is called the Bottom-up Adaptive 
Macroeconomics (BAM) model, belonging to the agent-based computational (ABC) models class. 
ABC models are alternative to the mainstream dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models (DSGE 
– a class of models, based on the general economic equilibrium assumption, considering a temporal 
development of the system with stochastic random shocks) [15]. ABC economics is the use of 
computer simulations to grow and study evolving artificial economies composed of many autonomous 
interacting agents [14]. 
Their advantages include but are not limited to: 
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▪ Heterogeneity – it is computationally indifferent whether the model consists of similar objects 
or of heterogeneous ones. 
▪ Explicit definitions – one can easily define explicitly the spaces where agents are placed, the 
law's interaction between agents, including, for example, the possibility of bounded rationality 
assumption (one of the core assumptions in New Institutional Economics, also quite a fruitful 
approach).  
▪ Non-equilibrium dynamics – ABC models allow to investigate the whole market processes, 
instead of standard considerations on start-end equilibrium states. 
For the sake of fairness, it is worth considering the main disadvantages:  
▪ Hard to fit the model to the real data, i.e. not allowing to make predictions. 
▪ The model tends to overfit in a sense that any desired dynamics could be modelled.  
On the other hand, these models allow to qualitatively describe investigated phenomena and even to 
test governmental policies, e.g. [16] or [17], what will be demonstrated in this thesis.  
ii. Brief model description 
The model simulates the whole country (of course, a hypothetical one) economy as a closed one (i.e. 
no external trade or cash flows). There are 3 types of economic agents on the supply side: firms, 
bankers and hired employees. All of them are pursuing their interests. Firms hire employees, 
employees create goods within firms. Banks lend money to firms to help them execute their plans and 
to each other to help giving loans to firms and to manage their liquidity. We introduce taxes only for 
the interbank loans, and this is the only point of systemic risk management. The intuition is the 
following: if the increasing systemic risk transactions are taxed more, then banks are less motivated to 
make deals exposing the whole system to fail. 
All these agents, on the other hand, behave as consumers on the market, i.e., demand side. They 
receive their wages (salary for workers, dividends for banks and firm holders). Then they construct 
their budgets and buy goods provided by firms.  
Most of the variables used have a stochastic nature, so, firms and banks can fail. Instead of the 
bankrupt firm, a new one is created, and when the bank defaults, the simulation is stopped, and 
macroeconomic variables are saved. Due to the stochasticity, the simulation has always to be repeated 
many times, and the obtained sampled distributions of the macroeconomic variables are analyzed.  
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III. Methods 
A. Description of the model 
In this section, we give a rundown of the algorithm of modelling the economy in detail. First, we begin 
with a sequence of events description, and then we will consider all the economic agents and events. 
We will consider them in the chronological order of every time step, providing formulae describing 
their behaviour at every step. For instance, not all the formulae assigned to firms will be in section 
“Firms” (III.A.ii), some of them will be introduced in “Credit market” (III.A.v) section. 
Note: the notation will be the same, as in the MATLAB code implementing the model; despite perhaps 
looking clumsy, we suppose the variables names to be useful, while it is plenty of them and ABM is 
actually developed for the computer implementation. 
In this table, the miscellaneous variables not assigned to certain economic agents are described. 
Variable Description 
𝑇 Maximum number of simulation steps 
𝑡 The current step of the simulation 
𝐹𝑡𝑜𝑡 Matrix of firm-bank borrowings at a current step. 
𝜏 Rate of debt reimbursements, for both firms and banks. 
𝑑𝑖𝑣 The ratio of dividends to be paid from the profits of both banks and firms to owners. 
𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖 General refinancing rate, defined externally. 
𝜁 Taxation parameter defined externally. 
Table 1. General variables description 
i. Sequence of events 
The simulation follows this sequence of events: 
1. The system is initialized, firms, banks and consumers are set with their initial capitals. 
2. Until any of banks defaults, or all of the firms fail, or the simulation time 𝑇 is run out (𝑡 > 𝑇), 
repeat: 
a. Firms define expected demands, prices and their labour demand. 
b. Firms apply for credits to banks. 
c. Banks apply for credits to other banks. 
d. Banks receive credits. 
e. Banks pay taxes. 
f. Firms receive credits. 
g. Firms adjust their expectations, prices and labour demand according to credits 
received. 
h. Firms hire and fire employees. 
i. Firms produce goods. 
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j. Firms pay wages to their workers. 
k. Consumers calculate their budgets and buy goods. 
l. Firms maintain their accounting: compute their profits and losses, pay interests, debts 
and dividends. 
m. Bankrupted firms vanish, new firms instead appear. 
n. Banks maintain their accounting. 
o. Banks default. 
p. Non-bankrupt banks participate in the interbank credit market to manage their 
liquidity. 
We illustrate this economic system with the following scheme: 
 
Figure 1. General scheme of the ABM 
ii. Firms 
Firms produce absolutely substitutable goods. They forecast the demand, the price they could charge, 
thus the amount of production and the number of workers needed to be hired for the production. In 
the case of a big number of workers to be hired, they need to raise capital (in this section, we consider 
only loans).  
More precisely: 
Variable Description 
𝐼 The number of firms 
𝐿𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖(𝑡) The current workforce of the 𝑖-th firm at the time step 𝑡. 
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𝑌𝑖(𝑡) Amount of production by the 𝑖-th firm at the time step 𝑡; in the beginning of every 
time step i,t is stock. So, in the beginning of time step 𝑡 considered, 𝑌𝑖(𝑡) is unsold 
goods, and 𝑌𝑖(𝑡 − 1) is previously produced. 
𝐷𝑒𝑖(𝑡) Expected demand estimated by the 𝑖-th firm at the time step 𝑡. 
𝑄𝑖(𝑡) Sales of the 𝑖-th firm at the time step 𝑡. 
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒(𝑡) Consumer price index (CPI) at the time step 𝑡. 
𝑃𝑖(𝑡) The price charged by the 𝑖-th firm at the time step 𝑡. 
𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡) 𝑖-th firm profit at time step 𝑡. 
𝛿𝑖(𝑡) Random variable distributed uniformly between 0 and 0.1; modelled in order to 
reflect operating individual specifics of the 𝑖-th firm at the time step 𝑡 (without 
considering the nature of this specifics).  
𝑤𝑏 Wage rate. 
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡) Wages 𝑖-th firm pays to all workers at the time step 𝑡. 
𝛼 Labour productivity. 
𝐿𝑑𝑖(𝑡) Labour demand of 𝑖-th firm. 
𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖(𝑡) Liquidity of 𝑖-th firm at the time step 𝑡 –the amount of cash resources they can 
spend, including profits and credits. 
𝐴𝑖(𝑡) 𝑖-th firm’s equity (book value) at the moment 𝑡. 
Table 2. Firms' variables. 
The firms estimate their expected demand according to the following rule: 
𝑌𝑖(𝑡) = 0 & 𝑃𝑖(𝑡)
≥ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒(𝑡) 
𝑌𝑖(𝑡) = 0 & 𝑃𝑖(𝑡)
< 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒(𝑡) 
𝑌𝑖(𝑡) > 0 & 𝑃𝑖(𝑡)
≥ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒(𝑡) 
𝑌𝑖(𝑡) > 0 & 𝑃𝑖(𝑡)
< 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒(𝑡) 
𝐷𝑒𝑖(𝑡)
= 𝑌𝑖(𝑡 − 1)
⋅ (1 + 𝛿𝑖(𝑡)) 
𝑃𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑃𝑖(𝑡 − 1) 
𝐷𝑒𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑌𝑖(𝑡 − 1) 
𝑃𝑖(𝑡)
= 𝑃𝑖(𝑡 − 1)
⋅ (1 + 𝛿𝑖(𝑡)) 
𝐷𝑒𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑌𝑖(𝑡 − 1) 
𝑃𝑖(𝑡)
= 𝑃𝑖(𝑡 − 1)
⋅ (1 − 𝛿𝑖(𝑡)) 
𝐷𝑒𝑖(𝑡)
= 𝑌𝑖(𝑡 − 1)
⋅ (1 − 𝛿𝑖(𝑡)) 
𝑃𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑃𝑖(𝑡 − 1) 
Equation 1. The rule for expected demand 
In other words; if the stock 𝑌𝑖(𝑡) is zero and the price 𝑃𝑖(𝑡) was greater than market average 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒(𝑡), 
then the demand 𝐷𝑒𝑖(𝑡) is expected to increase (stochastic variable 𝛿𝑖(𝑡) is for modelling of the 
decision making inside the firm) and the price is left untouched (Keynes’ sticky prices); if everything 
was sold (zero stock), but the price was under average – same expected demand, increase price; if 
there were goods left and price was above average – same production, decrease price; otherwise 
decrease expected demand, leave price untouched. Firms do not want to idle, so, just to have at least 
1 worker,  
𝐷𝑒𝑖(𝑡) = min(𝐷𝑒𝑖(𝑡), 𝛼) (𝐴. 𝑖𝑖. 2) 
Firms estimate their labour demand: 
𝐿𝑑𝑖(𝑡) = ⌈
𝐷𝑒𝑖(𝑡)
𝛼
⌉ , (𝐴. 𝑖𝑖. 3) 
where ⌈ ⌉ means roundup. (also, will be later redefined after credit market) 
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Firms have their equity, credits and interest rates, but we will consider other variables specific to firms 
in the context of firms’ interaction with other economic agents.  
Sum of wages to pay is also estimated (it will change later): 
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑤𝑏 ⋅ 𝐿𝑑𝑖(𝑡) (𝐴. 𝑖𝑖. 4) 
iii. Consumers 
Consumers, or households, consist of banks owners, firms owners (we can also call them capitalists) 
and workers. After their work is done and they receive their income, they act as consumers on the 
goods market. In this section, we will just describe their variables. 
Variable Description 
𝐼 + 𝐽 + 𝐵𝑘 The number of consumers (𝐽 is the number of workers). 
𝑃𝐴𝑖(𝑡) 𝑖-th household’s personal assets at the time step 𝑡. 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠_𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖(𝑡) Consumption budget of the household 𝑖 at the time step 𝑡 
𝑧 A number of applications in a consumption market. 
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖(𝑡) A number of the bank where 𝑖-th consumer keeps his cash. 
𝑂𝑐𝑖 Denotes by which firm is 𝑖-th worker occupied. 
𝑐 A propensity to consume. 
Table 3. Consumers variables 
iv. Banks 
Banks are described by the following variables: 
Variable Description 
𝐵𝑘 The number of banks. 
𝐸𝑖(𝑡) 𝑖-th bank’s equity at moment 𝑡. 
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖(𝑡) Loans given by bank 𝑖 to all the firms at the moment 𝑡. 
𝐸𝑥𝑝(𝑡) Matrix of interbank exposures (row index is the creditor, and the column is 
the borrower bank). 
𝐶𝑖(𝑡) Bank’s cash. 
𝑑𝑒𝑏(𝑡) Matrix of firm-bank exposures (column index is the creditor, and row is the 
borrower firm) 
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑡) Vector of length 𝐼, corresponding to the firm’s bank (i.e., where the firm 
keeps its 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦), that is, 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖(𝑡) is the number of bank holding 
𝑖-th firm’s cash. 
𝑝𝑖𝐵𝑖(𝑡) 𝑖-th bank profit at time step 𝑡. 
𝐶𝑖(𝑡) 𝑖-th bank cash resources (i.e. liquidity) at the time step 𝑡. 
Table 4. Banks variables 
v. Credit market  
The following variables are needed to describe the process of credit market clearance: 
Variable Description 
14 
 
𝐹𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑗 Total loans to the 𝑖-th firm from the 𝑗-th bank at the current step. 
𝐵𝑖 𝑖-th firm’s credit demand. 
𝑑𝑖 𝑖-th firm’s leverage. 
𝑛 The number of credit applications every firm can send to banks. 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 The threshold for firms to agree for the bank’s proposal – maximal interest 
rate they can afford. 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 Denotes inflation, i.e., change in CPI price. 
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑗 The amount of cash bank 𝑗 needs to satisfy a particular loan. 
𝜈 Minimal equity/loans given ratio defined by financial authorities. 
𝐸𝑥𝑝′(𝑡) Temporary variable; denotes exposure matrix 𝐸𝑥𝑝(𝑡) after the considered 
transaction for the interest rate calculation. 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑝 Leverage of the 𝑝-th bank; equals all the obligations to the bank divided by 
the bank’s equity. 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑝
′  Leverage of the 𝑝-th bank after the considered credit transaction. 
𝜒𝑗 Random variable, corresponding to 𝑗-th bank’s operating specifics. 
𝜓𝑗 Random variable, corresponding to other operating specifics of the bank 𝑗. 
𝜖𝑘 Another random variable, corresponding to operating specifics of the bank 
𝑘; 𝜖𝑘~𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓([0; 10
−15]). 
𝑉 Amount of all interbank credits given (excluding the considered loan). 
𝑉′ Amount of all interbank credits given (including the considered loan). 
𝑡𝑎𝑥 Temporary variable; denotes the rate of tax withheld from the interbank 
credit considered. 
𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑗(𝑘) = 𝑡𝑎𝑥 Tax for the loan to the 𝑗-th bank from the 𝑘-th one. 
𝑡𝑎𝑥_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑗  Temporary variable to remember tax corresponding to the best credit 
proposal to the bank 𝑗. 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗(𝑘) Interest rate proposed by the bank 𝑘 to the bank 𝑗. 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗 Interest rate proposed by the bank 𝑗  for the loan for the firm 𝑖. 
𝜙 Coefficient describing the shrinkage of firms’ credit appetite after exceeding 
the threshold. 
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 The size of credit given to the firm by the bank. 
𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 The size of interbank credit granted to finance firm loan; in (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖) it may 
also mean capital dilution, i.e. the money bank is raising. 
Table 5. Credit market variables 
The process sequence as follows: firms define, how much do they need for their production plan (i.e. 
their credit demand); then they send loan applications to a certain number of banks (this is how the 
asymmetry of information is modelled); then banks decide on how much do they need to satisfy the 
demand, and decide on their cash need (i.e. money they lack to give credits). Banks in need apply to 
each other for interbank loans, taxes for every transaction are calculated and based on this, they 
determine their rates for the firms applied. Firms choose the best proposals and correct their loan 
amounts again for the rates; based on this, banks take/give interbank loans, and then take/give loans 
to firms. A more detailed description is below. 
First, we set total bank-firm loans at this step to zero: 
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𝐹𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 𝟎 (𝐴. 𝑣. 1) 
Firms define their credit demand: 
𝐵𝑖 = 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖 − 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 (𝐴. 𝑣. 2) 
For the purposes we will discuss later, we calculate leverages for the firms, assuming the credit 𝐵𝑖 is 
granted: 
𝑑𝑖 =
∑ 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑗(𝑡)
𝐵𝑘
𝑗=1 + 𝐵𝑖
𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 0.01
 (𝐴. 𝑣. 3) 
0.01 term in the denominator needed to avoid division by zero. This leverage is just a ratio of debt 
and the firm’s cash. 
Firms with positive credit demand 𝐵𝑖 > 0 send applications each to 𝑛 banks. Firms also have a 
threshold of the interest rate at  
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 0.03 + 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝐴. 𝑣. 4) 
So, every firm 𝑖 with positive credit demand sends the application to randomly selected 𝑛 banks. Every 
bank 𝑗 received the application computes its cash need: 
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑗 = −min
(
 
 
0, 𝐸𝑗(𝑡)⏟
𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘′𝑠 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ ∑ 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖(𝑡)
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖=𝑗⏟                
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠′𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘
 
+ ∑ 𝑃𝐴𝑖(𝑡)
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖=𝑗⏟            
𝑝𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑙𝑒′𝑠 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘
− 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑗(𝑡)⏟    
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑏𝑦 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠
− ∑𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑗𝑖(𝑡)
𝑖⏟        
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑛 𝑏𝑦 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑡𝑜/𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠
− 𝐵𝑖⏟
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
)
 
 
       (𝐴. 𝑣. 5) 
In order to satisfy financial authorities’ requirements, credit recipient bank’s leverage ratio (equity 
divided by all the loans given including the claim from the firm) is computed:  
𝑙𝑒𝑣_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗 =
𝐸𝑗(𝑡)
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑗(𝑡) + ∑ max (0, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑗𝑖(𝑡))𝑖 + 𝐵𝑖
 (𝐴. 𝑣. 6) 
In case of leverage greater than a threshold 𝜈 (defined by financial authorities) and positive cash need, 
the considered bank sends applications to all the other banks. If the bank 𝑘 considered to finance 
bank 𝑗 is able to do this, i.e., if  
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𝐸𝑘(𝑡) + ∑ 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖(𝑡)
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖=𝑘
+ ∑ 𝑃𝐴𝑖(𝑡)
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖=𝑘
− 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑘(𝑡) −∑𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑘𝑖(𝑡)
𝑖
− 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑗(𝑡) > 0                                                                                             (𝐴. 𝑣. 7) 
then we compute the following quantities (just like imagining the interbank loan was granted) to 
calculate the corresponding tax: 
𝐸𝑥𝑝′(𝑡) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝(𝑡) (𝐴. 𝑣. 8) 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑘𝑗
′ (𝑡) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑘𝑗(𝑡) + 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑗 (𝐴. 𝑣. 9) 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑗𝑘
′ (𝑡) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑗𝑘(𝑡) − 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑗 (𝐴. 𝑣. 10) 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑝 =
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝(𝑡) + ∑ max (0, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑖(𝑡))𝑖
𝐸𝑝(𝑡)
, ∀𝑝 ∈ 1, . . , 𝐵𝑘 (𝐴. 𝑣. 11) 
𝑙𝑒𝑣′𝑝 =
{
 
 
 
 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝(𝑡) + ∑ max (0, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑖(𝑡))𝑖
𝐸𝑝(𝑡)
, ∀𝑝 ≠ 𝑗
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝(𝑡) + 𝐵𝑖 + ∑ max (0, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑖
′ (𝑡))𝑖
𝐸𝑝(𝑡)
, 𝑝 = 𝑗
(𝐴. 𝑣. 12) 
𝑉 =∑∑max(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑗 , 0)
𝑗𝑖
(𝐴. 𝑣. 13) 
𝑉′ =∑∑max(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑗
′ , 0)
𝑗𝑖
(𝐴. 𝑣. 14) 
𝜒𝑗~𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓(0,1), 𝑗 ∈ 1,… , 𝐵𝑘 (𝐴. 𝑣. 15) 
𝜓𝑗~𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓(0,0.1), 𝑗 ∈ 1,… , 𝐵𝑘 (𝐴. 𝑣. 16) 
𝑙𝑒𝑣 and 𝑙𝑒𝑣′ are needed to compute the tax, so are 𝑉 and 𝑉′ denoting the amount of interbank credits 
given (excluding and including the considered loan respectively). 𝜒 and 𝜓 correspond to modelling of 
operating specifics of every bank. We will return to the moment of calculating the tax rate in the 
corresponding sections (III.B.vi – III.B.ix); we will reference this computed at this stage value as 𝑡𝑎𝑥. 
Compute leverage ratio (but for the bank 𝑘 now) once again: 
 
𝑙𝑒𝑣_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝐸𝑘(𝑡)
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑘(𝑡) + ∑ max(0, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑘𝑖(𝑡))𝑖 + 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑗
(𝐴. 𝑣. 17)  
And if this is greater than 𝜈, the procedure continues. Based on the contractor characteristics 
(calculated above), the 𝑘-th bank calculates its proposed rate by the formula used in [6]: 
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𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗(𝑘)
= 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖 ⋅ (1 + 𝜒𝑗 ⋅ 𝑡𝑎𝑛ℎ(𝑑𝑖) +
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑗
𝐵𝑖
⋅ 𝜓𝑘 ⋅ 𝑡𝑎𝑛ℎ(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑗
′)) +
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑗
𝐵𝑖
  
⋅ 𝑡𝑎𝑥                                                                                                                                                     (𝐴. 𝑣. 18) 
The tax computed here will be remembered as the tax for the loan to 𝑗 from 𝑘: 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑗(𝑘) = 𝑡𝑎𝑥.  
We return to the firm-bank transaction, and write down the proposed rate for the 𝑖-th firm 
(introducing 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 matrix): 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗 = min
𝑘
(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗(𝑘) + 𝜖𝑘) (𝐴. 𝑣. 19) 
In the following variable we will remember the corresponding tax – 𝑡𝑎𝑥_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑗 . 
In case when the bank 𝑗 did not need to take interbank credit to give loan to the firm 𝑖,  
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗 = 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖 ⋅ (1 + 𝜒𝑗 ⋅ tanh(𝑑𝑖)) (𝐴. 𝑣. 20) 
After the firm gathered banks’ proposals, it takes the best-proposed rate and remembers the bank that 
proposed it:  
𝑗 = argmin
𝑗
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗 (𝐴. 𝑣. 21) 
If there were any of banks received applications that could give a loan, i.e., if the 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 is 
defined, then there are 2 options: 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗 > 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵𝑖 (𝐴. 𝑣. 22) 
𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 = 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑗 (𝐴. 𝑣. 23) 
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙 ⋅ 𝐵𝑖 (𝐴. 𝑣. 22
′) 
𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 = max(0, 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑗 − (1 − 𝜙)𝐵𝑖) (𝐴. 𝑣. 23
′) 
 
where 𝜙 is the coefficient describing the shrinkage of firms’ credit appetite after exceeding the 
threshold.  
So, if 𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 > 0, i.e., if the bank has to take credit, then: 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑘𝑗(𝑡) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑘𝑗(𝑡) + 𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 (𝐴. 𝑣. 24) 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑗𝑘(𝑡) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑗𝑘(𝑡) − 𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 (𝐴. 𝑣. 25) 
𝑙𝑒𝑣′𝑝 =
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝(𝑡) + ∑ max (0, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑖(𝑡))𝑖
𝐸𝑝(𝑡)
, ∀𝑝 ∈ 1,… , 𝐵𝑘 (𝐴. 𝑣. 26) 
𝐸𝑘(𝑡) = 𝐸𝑘(𝑡) + 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖 ⋅ (1 + 𝜓𝑘 ⋅ tanh(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑗
′)) ⋅ 𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 (𝐴. 𝑣. 27) 
𝐸𝑗(𝑡) = 𝐸𝑗(𝑡) − 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖 ⋅ (1 + 𝜓𝑘 ⋅ tanh(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑗
′)) ⋅ 𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 (𝐴. 𝑣. 28) 
𝐸𝑘(𝑡) = 𝐸𝑘(𝑡) − 𝑡𝑎𝑥_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑗 ⋅ 𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 (𝐴. 𝑣. 29) 
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And then we update the following variables: 
𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑗(𝑡) + 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 (𝐴. 𝑣. 30) 
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑗(𝑡) + 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 (𝐴. 𝑣. 31) 
𝐹𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 𝐹𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 (𝐴. 𝑣. 32) 
After all the credits are given and taken, we update the liquidity: 
𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗(𝑡) =  𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗(𝑡) +∑𝐹𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑖
𝑖
, ∀𝑗 ∈ 1, . . , 𝐼 (𝐴. 𝑣. 33) 
vi. Job market clearance 
Labour demand is redefined: 
𝐿𝑑𝑖(𝑡) = ⌊min(𝐿𝑑,
𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖(𝑡)
𝑤𝑏
)⌋ , (𝐴. 𝑣𝑖. 1) 
where ⌊ ⌋ means integer part. 
So, the firms also define the number of vacancies they are looking for, i.e., the difference between 
labour demand and existing workforce:  
𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 = 𝐿𝑑𝑖(𝑡) − 𝐿𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖(𝑡) (𝐴. 𝑣𝑖. 2) 
So, firms with a surplus (𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 < 0) fire randomly − 𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 workers, setting 
corresponding 𝑂𝑐 vector components to zero, and 𝐿𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖(𝑡) to 𝐿𝑑𝑖(𝑡). 
Firms with workforce deficit randomly hire either 𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 people or as much as they can (in case 
of no unemployed left), changing corresponding variables. 
vii. Production market clearance 
Having certain market-defined conditions – first of all, workforce (firms might have corrected their 
initial plans because of the credit amount different from the desired one and the number of hired 
employees could also differ because of workforce deficit) – firms update their plans: 
𝑌𝑖(𝑡) = min(𝐷𝑒𝑖, 𝛼 ⋅ 𝐿𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖) (𝐴. 𝑣𝑖𝑖. 1) 
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑤𝑏 ⋅ 𝐿𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖(𝑡) (𝐴. 𝑣𝑖𝑖. 2) 
Compute interests: 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖 =∑𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗 ⋅ 𝐹𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑗
𝐵𝑘
𝑗=1
(𝐴. 𝑣𝑖𝑖. 3) 
Redefine prices (they should not be less than break-even prices): 
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𝑃𝑖(𝑡) = max(𝑃𝑖(𝑡), 1.05 ⋅
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖(𝑡)
𝑌𝑖(𝑡)
) (𝐴. 𝑣𝑖𝑖. 4) 
viii. Consumption market clearance 
Workers receive a salary: 
𝑃𝐴𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑃𝐴𝑖(𝑡 − 1) + 𝑤𝑏 ⋅ 𝐼(𝑂𝑐𝑖(𝑡) ≠ 0), 𝑖 ∈ 1,… , 𝐽 (𝐴. 𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖. 1) 
𝐼(… ) is an indicator function, equals 1 in case of the correct statement in brackets or 0 otherwise. 
All the households (including capitalists and bankers) define their consumption budgets: 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠_𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑃𝐴𝑖(𝑡) ⋅ 𝑐, (𝐴. 𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖. 2) 
where 𝑐 is a propensity to consume. 
And subtract it from their personal assets: 
𝑃𝐴𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑃𝐴𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠_𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖(𝑡) (𝐴. 𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖. 3) 
Consumers with positive 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠_𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 are picked randomly. Every consumer selects randomly 𝑧 
firms, sorts prices in ascending order and continues buying till the budget is positive and there are 
firms with any goods left.  
ix. Firms accounting 
We compute firms’ profits and update their states: 
𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑃𝑖(𝑡) ⋅ 𝑄𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖(𝑡) − 𝜏
⋅∑𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑗(𝑡)
𝐵𝑘
𝑗=1
                                                                                                           (𝐴. 𝑖𝑥. 1) 
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑗(𝑡) −∑𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑗(𝑡)
𝐼
𝑖=1
 (𝐴. 𝑖𝑥. 2) 
𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑗(𝑡) = (1 − 𝜏) ⋅ 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑗(𝑡) (𝐴. 𝑖𝑥. 3) 
Eventually, the profits of firms: 
𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑃𝑖(𝑡) ⋅ 𝑄𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖(𝑡) (𝐴. 𝑖𝑥. 4) 
 
Firms with positive profits pay dividends (consider 𝑖-th firm): 
𝑃𝐴𝐽+𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑃𝐴𝐽+𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑑𝑖𝑣 ⋅ 𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡)⏟      
𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖
 (𝐴. 𝑖𝑥. 5)
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𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑑𝑖𝑣 ⋅ 𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡) (𝐴. 𝑖𝑥. 6) 
𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡) ⋅ (1 − 𝑑𝑖𝑣) (𝐴. 𝑖𝑥. 7) 
Update firms’ equities: 
𝐴𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐴𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡) (𝐴. 𝑖𝑥. 8) 
x. Firms defaults 
Consider firms with negative liquidity. These firms (let us denote one of them with index 𝑖) are bailed-
in by their owners: 
𝐴𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐴𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑃𝐴𝐽+𝑖(𝑡) (𝐴. 𝑥. 1) 
𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑃𝐴𝐽+𝑖(𝑡) (𝐴. 𝑥. 2) 
𝑃𝐴𝐽+𝑖(𝑡) = 0 (𝐴. 𝑥. 3) 
If 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖(𝑡) is still negative, the firm goes bankrupt. We update necessary macroparameters in 
order to account for this default in different time series for analyzing the system’s evolution. 
Banks lose their loans: 
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑗(𝑡) − 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑗(𝑡) (𝐴. 𝑥. 4) 
Firm vanishes, and instead of it a new one appears with average market characteristics: 
𝐴𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑃𝐴𝐽+𝑖(𝑡) (𝐴. 𝑥. 5) 
𝑃𝐴𝐽+𝑖(𝑡) = 0 (𝐴. 𝑥. 6) 
𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐴𝑖(𝑡) (𝐴. 𝑥. 7) 
𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑗(𝑡) = 0, ∀𝑗 ∈ 1,… , 𝐵𝑘 (𝐴. 𝑥. 8) 
𝐷𝑒𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 (𝐷𝑒𝐴(𝑖)>0(𝑡)) (𝐴. 𝑥. 9) 
𝑃𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 (𝑃𝐴(𝑖)>0(𝑡)) (𝐴. 𝑥. 10) 
𝑌𝑖(𝑡 − 1) = 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 (𝑌𝐴(𝑖)>0(𝑡)) (𝐴. 𝑥. 11) 
𝑌𝑖(𝑡) = 1 (𝐴. 𝑥. 12) 
xi.  Banks accounting 
Banks accounting is similar to firms accounting. Banks receive their profits: 
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𝑝𝑖𝐵𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑝𝑖𝐵𝑖(𝑡) +∑𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗𝑖 ⋅ 𝐹𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑖
𝐼
𝑗=1
(𝐴. 𝑥𝑖. 1) 
Banks (consider 𝑖-th bank) with positive profits pay dividends: 
𝑃𝐴𝐽+𝐼+𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑃𝐴𝐽+𝐼+𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑑𝑖𝑣 ⋅ 𝑝𝑖𝐵𝑖(𝑡) (𝐴. 𝑥𝑖. 2) 
𝑝𝑖𝐵𝑖(𝑡) = (1 − 𝑑𝑖𝑣) ⋅ 𝑝𝑖𝐵𝑖(𝑡) (𝐴. 𝑥𝑖. 3) 
𝐸𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐸𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑝𝑖𝐵𝑖(𝑡) (𝐴. 𝑥𝑖. 4) 
Banks repay interbank loans: 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑗(𝑡) = (1 − 𝜏) ⋅ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑗(𝑡) (𝐴. 𝑥𝑖. 5) 
xii. Banks defaults 
If any of banks have negative equity (𝐸𝑗 < 0), then it is considered to be the default; its debts are loss 
in others’ banks equities (this is the way defaults can propagate), and its loans are annulled:  
𝐸𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐸𝑖(𝑡) − max (0, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑗(𝑡)) (𝐴. 𝑥𝑖𝑖. 1) 
𝐸𝑗(𝑡) = 0 (𝐴. 𝑥𝑖𝑖. 2) 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑗𝑖(𝑡) = 0, 𝑖: 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑗𝑖(𝑡) < 0 (𝐴. 𝑥𝑖𝑖. 3) 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑗(𝑡) = 0, 𝑖: 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑗(𝑡) > 0 (𝐴. 𝑥𝑖𝑖. 4) 
xiii. Interbank market 
Banks cannot maintain their functions even with positive equity if they have a negative amount of 
cash: 
𝐶𝑗(𝑡) = 𝐸𝑗(𝑡) + ∑ 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖(𝑡)
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖=𝑗
 + ∑ 𝑃𝐴𝑖(𝑡)
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖=𝑗
− 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑗(𝑡) −∑𝐸𝑗𝑖(𝑡)
𝐵𝑘
𝑖=1
(𝐴. 𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖. 1) 
For bank 𝑗 with negative cash 𝐶𝑗(𝑡) pick up randomly a bank 𝑘 with 𝐶𝑘(𝑡) > 0. If both banks have 
positive equity, 𝑘 borrows money to 𝑗 trying to cover its cash need. 
𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 = min (−𝐶𝑗(𝑡), 𝐶𝑘(𝑡)) (𝐴. 𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖. 2) 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑘𝑗(𝑡) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑘𝑗(𝑡) + 𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 (𝐴. 𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖. 3) 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑗𝑘(𝑡) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑗𝑘(𝑡) − 𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 (𝐴. 𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖. 4) 
𝐶𝑗(𝑡) = 𝐶𝑗(𝑡) + 𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 (𝐴. 𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖. 5) 
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𝐶𝑘(𝑡) = 𝐶𝑘(𝑡) − 𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 (𝐴. 𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖. 6) 
B. Network-based systemic risk metrics 
In this section, we first discuss network-based systemic risk metrics used for taxation and then 
describe, how exactly the 𝑡𝑎𝑥 variable is calculated. 
i. Degree 
In network theory, there is a class of metrics called centralities. All of them are aimed to catch different 
“centrality” aspects of the considered node in the network. The most obvious and simple is degree 
centrality, which is: 
▪ For the undirected unweighted graph, it is the number of incident edges of a vertex; 
▪ For the undirected weighted graph, it is the sum of weights of incident edges of a vertex; 
▪ For the directed weighted graph, it could be the sum of weights of incident incoming or 
outcoming (or their sum) edges. In this case, this is usually referred to as in-degree and out-
degree. 
In our case nodes are banks, \directed links are credits given, and weights are loans amounts. 
ii. Original (acyclic) DebtRank 
Different attempts have been tried in order to develop a model determining systemically important 
financial institutions, and one of them was DebtRank [5]. Compared to other models, like Eisenberg-
Noe, Rogers-Veraart, Default Cascades, original DebtRank does not imply strictly greater 
vulnerabilities [8] like cyclic DebtRank but accounts more for network effects and in practice still 
usually demonstrates greater vulnerabilities.  
The algorithm allows for obtaining more general results than it is used in this thesis. In general, one 
has to define the initial disturbances vector and then to obtain a vector of final disturbances with 
propagated stress. 
As the initial stress vector, we use vector with only one component valued 1, and other components 
are zero. This means, that in an initial state only one bank defaults, and others are untouched. Then 
we obtain a vector of distress caused. Multiplying this vector by the vector of equities and dividing it 
by the sum of all equities, we obtain the fraction of assets in the system, that are distressed by the 
failure of a certain bank, corresponding to a single unit-component in the initial distress vector. 
Repeating this procedure for all the banks, we obtain a vector of exposed system’s assets fractions. 
Let us describe it in a mathematical fashion. 
If the bank’s equity is less than a certain positive threshold (𝐸𝑗 ≤ 𝛾), it defaults. If the node 𝑗 defaults, 
node 𝑖 loses max(0, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑗). In case of loss greater than capital the bank 𝑖 has, the 𝑖-th bank also 
defaults: max(0, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑗) ≥ 𝐸𝑖 . So, the impact of the node 𝑖 on the node 𝑗 is define as the following 
matrix 
𝑊𝑖𝑗 = min (1,
max(0,𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑗𝑖)
𝐸𝑗
) , (𝐵. 𝑖𝑖. 1) 
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meaning, that in case of loss exceeding capital, the impact is 1. We introduce the following state 
parameters in a financial distress contagion process modelled: ℎ𝑖(𝑡) ∈ [0,1] and 𝑠𝑖(𝑡) = {𝑈, 𝐷, 𝐼} – 
undistressed, distressed and inactive (default). ℎ𝑖(𝑡) = 0 denotes undistressed node, while ℎ𝑖(𝑡) = 1 
means default. Putting initial conditions on ℎ𝑖(1), 𝑠𝑖(1), 𝑖 ∈ 1, … , 𝐵𝑘, we iterate the contagion 
process: 
ℎ𝑖(𝑡) = min{1, ℎ𝑖(𝑡 − 1) + ∑ 𝑊𝑗𝑖 ⋅ ℎ𝑗(𝑡 − 1)
𝑗:𝑠𝑗(𝑡−1)=𝐷
} (𝐵. 𝑖𝑖. 2) 
𝑠𝑖(𝑡) = {
𝐷, 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑖(𝑡) > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑖(𝑡) ≠ 𝐼
𝐼, 𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑖(𝑡 − 1) = 𝐷
𝑠𝑖(𝑡 − 1), 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
(𝐵. 𝑖𝑖. 3) 
Please note, that “inactive” does not mean default, it only denotes nodes that are no more involved in 
the contagion process. State variables 𝑠𝑖 are aimed to exclude walks with repeating edges in order to 
have impacts of a node not greater than one. 
The economic value of any node is denoted by  
𝑣𝑖 =
∑ max(0, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑗𝑖)𝑗
∑ ∑ max(0, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑘𝑗)𝑘𝑗
 (𝐵. 𝑖𝑖. 4) 
After a certain number of iterations 𝑇 all the nodes either belong to inactive or to undistressed. 
Originally the Debtrank of a set 𝑆𝑓 was defined as follows: 
𝑅𝑆𝑓
′ =∑ℎ𝑗(𝑇)
𝑗
⋅ 𝑣𝑗 −∑ℎ𝑗(1) ⋅ 𝑣𝑗
𝑗⏟        
𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠
, (𝐵. 𝑖𝑖. 5)
 
meaning only induced distress. For our purpose DebtRank also includes initial distress: 
𝑅𝑆𝑓
′ =∑ℎ𝑗(𝑇)
𝑗
⋅ 𝑣𝑗 (𝐵. 𝑖𝑖. 6) 
In our case set 𝑆𝑓 is a single node. 
iii. Cyclic DebtRank 
By introducing discrete state variables, the original DebtRank loses the amplification of distress in 
cyclic paths. Model fixing this problem was introduced in [18]. This extended model is called cyclic 
DebtRank, or differential DebtRank. The underlying process for vulnerabilities is the following: 
ℎ𝑖(𝑡) = min {1, ℎ𝑖(𝑡 − 1) +∑𝑊𝑗𝑖 (ℎ𝑗(𝑡 − 1) − ℎ𝑗(𝑡 − 2))
𝐵𝑘
𝑗=1
} (𝐵. 𝑖𝑖𝑖. 1) 
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The paper [8] contains an analytical proof, that vulnerabilities from cyclic DebtRank are greater than 
ones obtained by Eisenberg-Noe and Rogers-Veraart models regardless of the network topology. 
iv. SinkRank 
Another algorithm developed for determining systemically important banks was proposed in [11] 
specifically for payment systems. 
Our network is considered as a graph. We define an absorbing random walk as a random walk 
terminated at a certain absorbing node – sink. The greater is the expected number of steps till 
absorbance, the less central (in terms of network’s centrality measure) is the absorbing node. 
Having an adjacency matrix of the network 𝑀 = [𝑠𝑖𝑗]𝑛×𝑛, we define transition matrix as  
𝑃 = [
𝑠𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑗
]
𝑛×𝑛
, (𝐵. 𝑖𝑣. 1) 
 where matrix elements are transition probabilities for a random walk. In the original paper, this 
network was the network of banks, and link weights were payment value, while we will use credit 
amounts instead. Let 𝑚 be the number of absorbing nodes; then define a matrix  
𝑆 = [𝑠𝑖𝑗](𝑛−𝑚)×(𝑛−𝑚),
(𝐵. 𝑖𝑣. 2) 
where columns and rows corresponding to the absorbing nodes in 𝑀 are excluded. Also, let 𝐼 to be 
(𝑛 − 𝑚) × (𝑛 −𝑚) identity matrix; then  
𝑄 = (𝐼 − 𝑆)−1 (𝐵. 𝑖𝑣. 3) 
is the matrix, where 𝑞𝑖𝑗 defines the number of times starting at 𝑖 a process is expected to visit 𝑗 before 
the absorption. Sum of all entries of the matrix in the 𝑖-th row is called Sink Distance. 
SinkRank is then defined as an inverted average Sink Distance for all the nodes:  
𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 =
𝑛−𝑚
∑ ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖
(𝐵. 𝑖𝑣. 4)  
For our application, we always have 𝑚 = 1, and we repeatedly calculate SinkRank for every node, 
considering it to be absorbing. 
v. 2-step DebtRank 
The idea of DebtRank used for taxation described in [6] is attractive: small but smart tax rapidly 
increases the banking system’s robustness. Besides the real-world implementation difficulties – 
someone computing this tax has to know about all the interbank credits given every time the 
transaction is considered – this tax is unconstitutional. Authors of [6] were contacted by European 
authorities with interest to implement; however, lawyers claimed, that one cannot be taxed according 
to others’ behaviour. 
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We decided if it is possible to “cut” DebtRank’s propagation in order to take into account only 
neighbours of 2 counteragents. 
Let us walk through the whole (original) DebtRank procedure. First, we slightly transform the 
vulnerability propagation process: 
ℎ𝑖(𝑡) = min{1, ℎ𝑖(𝑡 − 1) +∑𝑊𝑗𝑖 ⋅ ℎ𝑗(𝑡 − 1)
𝑗
} , 𝑡 = 2,… ,3 (𝐵. 𝑣. 1) 
Say, initial condition on ℎ is ℎ(1) = (0,0, … , 1⏟
𝑖
, … , 0,0,0). Then, in the next step ℎ(2) has the 
vulnerability propagated to the neighbors of the bankrupt bank. Neighbors of neighbors are affected 
in the third step. 
For the 𝑖-th bank, we calculate truncated losses, that might be induced by its failure:  
𝑅𝑖
2′ =∑ℎ𝑗(3)
𝑗
⋅ 𝑣𝑗 (𝐵. 𝑣. 2) 
vi. Taxation: in- and out-degrees 
Having a value quantifying systemic risk, the systemic risk tax is easy to calculate as a tax rate multiplied 
by the positive part of the difference in systemic risk induced by the transaction. 
As it was mentioned in the previous section, the most obvious centrality measure is degree centrality. 
Just because in our model tax is withheld from the creditor, in-degree of the creditor and out-degree 
of the borrower are the same and stay unchanged; change in out-degree of the creditor (equal to in-
degree of the borrower) is equal to Tobin tax (tax proportional to the transaction volume). We also 
considered tax based on the absolute value of the out-degree of the borrower (not its change) but 
declined this idea as destimulating the economy to evolve. However, this might have changed the 
whole topology of the interbank network.  
As we can see, this tax is not a systemic risk tax. It equals the parameter defined externally: 
𝑡𝑎𝑥 = 𝜁 (𝐵. 𝑣𝑖. 1) 
vii. Taxation: DebtRanks 
Defining an external variable 𝜁 that means a fraction of systemic risk induced to be penalized by 
taxation, we follow the original paper [6] and derive the following rule: 
𝑆𝑅𝑇 = 𝜁 ⋅ max [0,∑𝑝𝑖(𝑡)(𝑉
′𝑅𝑖
(+𝑘) − 𝑉 ⋅ 𝑅𝑖)
𝑖
] , (𝐵. 𝑣𝑖𝑖. 1) 
Where index (+𝑘) denotes “after transaction” variable, 𝑅𝑖 is 𝑖-th DebtRank, 𝑉 =
∑ ∑ max(0, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑗)𝑗𝑖 , 𝑝𝑖(𝑡) is the probability of 𝑖-th bank to default on the maturity date of the loan 
(for the sake of simplicity; [6] proposes valuation similar to [19], [20]). In our implementation, this 
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probability is approximated with the hyperbolic tangent of the leverage 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖 or 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖
′ (III.A.v), like it 
was done in [6], i.e.: 
𝑝𝑖(𝑡) = 0.01 ⋅ tanh(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖) (𝐵. 𝑣𝑖𝑖. 2) 
While the transaction affects the probability of default, in the final expression there are two different 
probabilities. Taking into account all of these considerations, we obtain: 
𝑡𝑎𝑥 = 𝜁 ⋅
max [0, ∑ 0.01(tanh(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖
′) ⋅ 𝑉(+𝑘)𝑅𝑖
(+𝑘) − tanh(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖) ⋅ 𝑉 ⋅ 𝑅𝑖)𝑖: ]
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑗
(𝐵. 𝑣𝑖𝑖. 3) 
viii. Taxation: 2-step DebtRank  
Having a goal not to consider nodes 3 and more steps away from 2 contractors, we also have to make 
amends to the (𝐵. 𝑣𝑖𝑖. 3). For banks 𝑗 and 𝑘  we obtain: 
𝑡𝑎𝑥 = 𝜁 ⋅
max [0, ∑ 0.01 (tanh(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖
′) ⋅ 𝑉′ ⋅ 𝑅2
′
𝑖
(+𝑘)
− tanh(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖) ⋅ 𝑉 ⋅ 𝑅𝑖
2′)𝑖:𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑗≠0 𝑜𝑟 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑘≠0 ]
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑗
(𝐵. 𝑖𝑥. 1) 
Here 
𝑉 =∑max(0, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑗)
𝑖
+∑max(0, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑘)
𝑖
, (𝐵. 𝑖𝑥. 2) 
And 𝑉′ equals the same but using 𝐸𝑥𝑝′. 
ix. Taxation: SinkRank 
SinkRank has a different interpretation than DebtRank: this is “how close” is the bank to other banks 
via credit network. However, it has the interval of the same values (0; 1], so, we are free to use it the 
same way as DebtRanks were used; instead of payment matrix, we used max (0, 𝐸𝑥𝑝). 
C.  Equity introduced in the model 
As a side experiment, it was also tested, how the model behaviour would change, if a new layer in the 
network would be included. The first idea was to introduce equity relations: two major financing 
sources for businesses are credit and equity. Without certain expectations except for DebtRank 
behaviour (IV.B), we decided to model this, solving several particular issues, also penalizing systemic 
risk in a new layer. 
i. Market pricing modelling 
There were three approaches considered: 
- Discounted cash flows (DCF) valuation [21]; 
- Geometric Brownian motion modelling; 
- Valuation using multiples [22]; 
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DCF has the advantage of imitation of the real valuation processes; this is how investment projects 
are evaluated by the business. Based on the history of dividends paid to the capitalist, one can use 
Gordon’s formula to estimate share’s price.   
We decided to calculate the price of the company as follows: 
𝑃𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 = 𝑃𝑉𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 + 𝑃𝑉𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 + 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑦𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 ⋅ Pr{𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑦} ⋅ 𝑃𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦, (𝐶. 𝑖. 1) 
where 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑦𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 denotes the average fraction of the company price needed to perform the 
bankruptcy procedure. 
Then we expressed 𝑃𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦, and obtained: 
𝑃𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 =
𝑃𝑉𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 + 𝑃𝑉𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑
1 + 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑦𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 ⋅ Pr{𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑦}
, (𝐶. 𝑖. 2) 
As the proxy for the bankruptcy probability we used the leverage of the company:  
Pr{𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑦} ≝
𝐷
𝐸 + 𝐷
= 1 −
𝐸
𝐸 + 𝐷
, (𝐶. 𝑖. 3) 
where 𝐸 is the firm’s equity, and 𝐷 is its debt. 
𝑃𝑉𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 was estimated as the infinite rent of profits equal to the last profit discounted by last 
return on equity: 
𝑃𝑉𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 =
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛_𝑜𝑛_𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
(𝐶. 𝑖. 4) 
Tax shield value was estimated as  
𝑃𝑉𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 = 𝐷 ⋅ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝐶. 𝑖. 5) 
To avoid any problems with negative, infinite, NaN market values, there were boundaries introduced: 
𝑃𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 ∈ [0.1; 1000] – in practice, we were constantly facing this problem. This also refers to 
banks evaluation. 
A problem with a warm-up period appeared: at a first step, firms were evaluated to be too expensive, 
thus selecting the source of financing to be equity, then their price went down, bankrupting banks. 
The system was too short-living to be investigated, and we could not create an adequate valuation 
model within DCF framework. 
Valuation using multiples is also the way to imitate real business decision making, but it was not 
implemented due to geometric Brownian motion modelling was implemented, and we did not see any 
reason to implement another model: no essentially new results could be obtained. 
Valuation with geometric Brownian motion is the easiest one and does not imply problems with 
volatile market prices we observed with DCF valuation. Moreover, it has explicit parameters to tune 
– drift rate and volatility. If we would like to model the effects of fat-tailed distributions of market 
prices, we could also easily do this within this framework. 
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Variables used for market pricing modelling: 
Variable Description 
𝜇 Drift rate of the firms’ market prices. 
𝜎 The volatility of the firms’ market prices. 
𝜇𝐵 Drift rate of the banks’ market prices. 
𝜎𝐵 The volatility of the banks’ market prices. 
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡) 𝑖-th firm price at the time step 𝑡. 
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝐵𝑗(𝑡) 𝑗-th bank price at the time step 𝑡. 
𝜉𝑖𝑡 𝜉𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0,1), 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑., 𝑖-th firm’s market price random 
increment between 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡 time steps. 
𝜖𝑖𝑡 𝜖𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0,1), 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑., 𝑖-th bank’s market price random 
increment between 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡 time steps. 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛_𝑜𝑛_𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖(𝑡) Return on equity of 𝑖-th firm at time step 𝑡. 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛_𝑜𝑛_𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐵𝑖(𝑡) Return on equity of 𝑖-th bank at time step 𝑡. 
𝜇𝑟𝑜𝑒 Mean value of return on equity for firms. 
𝜎𝑟𝑜𝑒 The standard deviation of return on equity for firms. 
𝜇𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑒 Mean value of return on equity for banks. 
𝜎𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑒 The standard deviation of return on equity for banks. 
𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑗(𝑡) Fraction of 𝑖
𝑡ℎ firm held by 𝑗𝑡ℎ bank, [𝐼 × 𝐵𝑘] matrix. 
𝑒𝑞𝐵𝑖𝑗(𝑡) 𝐹raction of 𝑖
𝑡ℎ bank held by 𝑗𝑡ℎ bank, [𝐵𝑘 × 𝐵𝑘] 
matrix. 
𝐸𝑓 [𝐼 × 𝐵𝑘] matrix of market values of firm fractions held 
by banks (i.e. 𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑗
(𝑡) = 𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑗(𝑡) ⋅
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡)). 
𝐸𝑏 [𝐵𝑘 × 𝐵𝑘] matrix of market values of bank fractions 
held by banks, the analogy with 𝐸𝑥𝑝, but for equity. 
𝑒𝑞_𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖 All the equity sold by the 𝑖-th firm. 
𝑒𝑞_𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑𝐵𝑖 All the equity sold by the 𝑖-th bank. 
𝜅  Buyback parameter; the fraction of the equity firms aim 
to buy back from the banks having their shares. 
Table 6. Market pricing variables 
Equity was modelled in the following fashion: 
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡)
= 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡 − 1) + 𝜇 ⋅ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡 − 1) ⋅ 1 + 𝜎
⋅ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡 − 1) ⋅ 𝜉𝑖𝑡,                                                                               (𝐶. 𝑖. 6) 
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝐵𝑖(𝑡)
= 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝐵𝑖(𝑡 − 1) + 𝜇 ⋅ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝐵𝑖(𝑡 − 1) ⋅ 1 + 𝜎
⋅ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝐵𝑖(𝑡 − 1) ⋅ 𝜖𝑖𝑡,                                                                            (𝐶. 𝑖. 7) 
Returns on equity modelled as independent identically distributed random values: 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛_𝑜𝑛_𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖(𝑡)~𝑁(𝜇𝑟𝑜𝑒 , 𝜎𝑟𝑜𝑒) (𝐶. 𝑖. 8) 
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𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛_𝑜𝑛_𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐵𝑖(𝑡)~𝑁(𝜇𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑒 , 𝜎𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑒) (𝐶. 𝑖. 9) 
Although being almost identical to the variables listed in Table 6, the following quantities are useful: 
𝑒𝑞_𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖 =∑𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝑗
(𝐶. 𝑖. 10) 
 
𝑒𝑞_𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑𝐵𝑖 =∑𝑒𝑞𝐵𝑖𝑗
𝑗
(𝐶. 𝑖. 11) 
𝐸𝑓 is [𝐼 × 𝐵𝑘] matrix of market values of firm fractions held by banks, i.e.  
𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑗
(𝑡) = 𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑗(𝑡) ⋅ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡) (𝐶. 𝑖. 12) 
𝐸𝑏 is [𝐵𝑘 × 𝐵𝑘] matrix of market values of bank fractions held by banks. 
Now the scheme slightly changed, and we illustrate it with the following picture: 
 
Figure 2. General scheme of ABM with equity layer 
ii. Credit/equity firms’ and banks’ decision modelling 
We introduce additional quantities and decision rules in the routine described in (III.A.v) part. First, 
let us think of why firms might raise capital via equity sell? If we do not take into account exceptional 
cases, like new ventures or firms with a low fraction of fixed assets (i.e. high price-to-book ratio) [23], 
then the only plausible reason we can implement (we are not willing to insert such things, as investors 
beliefs about managers beliefs [24]), is that it is more profitable. In other words, if the return on equity 
is less than the return on credit, then equity sell is preferred. It is fair for both banks and firms.  
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Having cash demand 𝐵𝑖, firms apply for capital raise to banks. Banks received applications may also 
have a need to draw on some money. After raising capital via debt/equity, banks prepare their 
proposals for the firms. Based on these rates, firms decide on their debt/equity capital raising.  
New variables for decision modeling: 
Variable Description 
𝐶𝑁 The maximal amount of money to be lent by the considered bank. 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 Amount of equity can be sold by the considered bank. 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 Maximal share of the firm that could be sold to the considered 
bank. 
𝑡𝑎𝑥_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑗𝑑 
Temporary variable to remember tax corresponding to the best 
credit proposal to the bank 𝑗; refers to credit layer. 
𝑡𝑎𝑥_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑗𝑒 
Temporary variable to remember tax corresponding to the best 
credit proposal to the bank 𝑗; refers to the equity layer. 
𝑉𝑑 Sum of all credit liabilities in the system before the transaction. 
𝑉𝑑
(+𝑘)
 Sum of all credit liabilities in the system after the transaction. 
𝑉𝑒 Sum of all equity liabilities in the system before the transaction. 
𝑉𝑒
(+𝑘)
 Sum of all equity liabilities in the system after the transaction. 
𝑅𝑖𝑑 DebtRank of the 𝑖-th node in the network before the transaction; 
credit layer. 
𝑅𝑖
(+𝑘)
𝑑
 DebtRank of the 𝑖-th node in the network after the transaction; 
credit layer. 
𝑅𝑖𝑒 DebtRank of the 𝑖-th node in the network before the transaction; 
equity layer; 
𝑅𝑖
(+𝑘)
𝑒
 DebtRank of the 𝑖-th node in the network after the transaction; 
equity layer. 
Table 7. Credit/equity decision modelling variables 
After the same steps, as in (𝐴. 𝑖𝑖. 1) − (𝐴. 𝑣. 7) are executed, the banks in a cash need to solve the 
following problem: 
𝐶𝑁 ∈ [0, 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑗]? : 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖 ⋅ (1 +
𝐶𝑁
𝐵𝑖
⋅ 𝜓𝑗 ⋅ 𝑡𝑎𝑛ℎ(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑗
′)) = 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛_𝑜𝑛_𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐵(𝑗) (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 1) 
Leverages whose hyperbolic tangents are proxies for default probabilities are adjusted in this case: 
 
𝑙𝑒𝑣′𝑝 =
{
 
 
 
 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝(𝑡)+ ∑ max (0, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑖(𝑡))𝑖
𝐸𝑝(𝑡)
, ∀𝑝 ≠ 𝑗
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝(𝑡)+𝐵𝑖 + ∑ max (0, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑖
′ (𝑡)+ 𝐶𝑁)𝑖
𝐸𝑝(𝑡)
, 𝑝 = 𝑗
 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 2) 
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𝐶𝑁 is the maximal amount of money to be lent (after this amount the interest rate provided to the 
bank would be greater than its return on equity, so, it would be less expensive to raise money via 
selling equity). In the case of  
𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖 ⋅ (1 +
𝐶𝑁
𝐵𝑖
⋅ 𝜓𝑗 ⋅ 𝑡𝑎𝑛ℎ(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑗
′)) − 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛_𝑜𝑛_𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐵𝑗|
𝐶𝑁=𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑗
< 0 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 3) 
we set 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 = 0, (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 4) 
and if 
𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖 ⋅ (1 +
𝐶𝑁
𝐵𝑖
⋅ 𝜓𝑗 ⋅ 𝑡𝑎𝑛ℎ(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑗
′)) − 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛_𝑜𝑛_𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐵𝑗|
𝐶𝑁=0
> 0, (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 5) 
we set 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 = 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑗 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 6) 
This newly introduced variable determines, how much of the equity can be sold by the bank. In the 
first case credit interest rate would be less than return on equity even in case of all the money would 
be raised by credit – this would mean, that we do not need to solve the problem on determining 𝐶𝑁 
– we see, that it would be profitable for the bank to apply for credit only; same thing is for the latter 
case. These boundary condition checks were made to avoid solving the equation above. In other case 
𝐶𝑁 is maximal of zero and solution of the equation above.  
After this problem is solved, and the upper bound for money raised as credit is determined, let us 
determine, how much of the equity should actually be sold: 
𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑗
= 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (0,𝑚𝑖𝑛([𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝐵𝑗
⋅ (0.8 − 𝑒𝑞_𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑𝐵𝑗),𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙, 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑗]))               (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 7)  
Bank will not sell less than zero, the bank will not sell more than 80% of its shares, the bank will not 
sell more than it needs, the bank will not sell more than it is profitable. 
Then the procedure is similar to one described before in (𝐴. 𝑣. 8) − (𝐴. 𝑣. 16): we imagine 
transactions to be conducted in order to estimate tax levied, same transformations take place, taking 
into account, that we have two types of taxes for two layers of the interbank network: 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑝′(𝑡) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝(𝑡) (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 8) 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑘𝑗
′ (𝑡) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑘𝑗(𝑡) + 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑗 − 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑗 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 9) 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑗𝑘
′ (𝑡) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑗𝑘(𝑡) − 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑗 + 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑗 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 10) 
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𝐸′ = 𝐸 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 11) 
𝐸𝑏
′ = 𝐸𝑏 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 12) 
𝐸𝑏𝑘𝑗
′ = 𝐸𝑏
′
𝑘𝑗
+ 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑗 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 13) 
𝐸𝑘
′ = 𝐸𝑘
′ − 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑗 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 14) 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑝 =
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝(𝑡) + ∑ max (0, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑖(𝑡))𝑖
𝐸𝑝(𝑡)
, ∀𝑝 ∈ 1, . . , 𝐵𝑘 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 15) 
𝑙𝑒𝑣′𝑝 =
{
 
 
 
 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝(𝑡) + ∑ max (0, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑖(𝑡))𝑖
𝐸𝑝′ (𝑡)
, ∀𝑝 ≠ 𝑗
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝(𝑡) + 𝐵𝑖 + ∑ max (0, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑖
′ (𝑡))𝑖
𝐸𝑝′ (𝑡)
, 𝑝 = 𝑗
(𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 16) 
𝑉𝑑 =∑∑max(0, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑗)
𝑗𝑖
 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 17) 
𝑉𝑑
(+𝑘) =∑∑max(0, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑗
′ )
𝑗𝑖
 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 18) 
𝑉𝑒 =∑∑max (0, 𝐸𝑏𝑖𝑗)
𝑗𝑖
(𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 19) 
𝑉𝑑
(+𝑘) =∑∑max (0, 𝐸𝑏𝑖𝑗
′ )
𝑗𝑖
 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 20) 
𝜒𝑗~𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓(0,1), 𝑗 ∈ 1,… , 𝐵𝑘 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 21) 
𝜓𝑗~𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓(0,0.1), 𝑗 ∈ 1,… , 𝐵𝑘 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 22) 
To compute systemic risk taxes, we also need 4 DebtRanks (2 layers, before and after) – 𝑅𝑖𝑑 , 
𝑅𝑖
(+𝑘)
𝑑
, 𝑅𝑖𝑒 and 𝑅𝑖
(+𝑘)
𝑒
.  
Finally, we can compute both taxes: 
𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑑 = 𝜁 ⋅
max [0, ∑ 0.01 (tanh(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖
′) ⋅ 𝑉𝑑
(+𝑘)𝑅𝑖
(+𝑘)
𝑑
− tanh(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖) ⋅ 𝑉𝑑 ⋅ 𝑅𝑖𝑑)𝑖 ]
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑗 − 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑗
 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 23) 
𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒 = 𝜁 ⋅
max [0, ∑ 0.01 (tanh(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖
′) ⋅ 𝑉𝑒
(+𝑘)𝑅𝑖
(+𝑘)
𝑒
− tanh(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖) ⋅ 𝑉𝑒 ⋅ 𝑅𝑖𝑒)𝑖 ]
𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑗
 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 24) 
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After determining these taxes, the bank estimates its own proposal for the firm in need: 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗(𝑘)
= 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖 ⋅ (1 + 𝜒𝑗 ⋅ tanh(𝑑𝑖) +
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑗
𝐵(𝑖)
⋅ 𝜓𝑘 ⋅ tanh(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑗
′))
+
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑗 − 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑗
𝐵𝑖
⋅ 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑑 +
𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑗
𝐵𝑖
⋅ 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒          (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 25) 
They are sorted and the bank 𝑗 with the best proposal is chosen. Now the final amounts of equity to 
sell and credits to get are defined. 
If there’s a sense in selling equity, i.e.  
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗(𝑡)  >  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛_𝑜𝑛_𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖(𝑡), (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 26) 
firm together with the bank defines, how much it could sell: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙
= min ([𝑚𝑎𝑥 (0,1 
−
𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡 − 1)
𝑃𝑖(𝑡 − 1) ⋅ 𝐷𝑒𝑖(𝑡 − 1) − 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡 − 1) − 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖(𝑡 − 1)
) ,𝑚𝑎𝑥(0,0.8
− 𝑒𝑞_𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖(𝑡)),
𝐸𝑗(𝑡)
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡)
])                                                          (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 27)  
In case if this covers all the financial need of the firm, i.e. 
(𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 − 𝑒𝑞_𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖(𝑡)) ⋅ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡) ≥   𝐵𝑖(𝑡), (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 28) 
then the firm sells only equity: 
𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑗(𝑡) =  𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑗(𝑡) +
𝐵𝑖(𝑡)
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡)
 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 29) 
𝐸𝑗(𝑡) =  𝐸𝑗(𝑡) − 𝐵𝑖(𝑡) (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 30) 
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 0 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 31) 
𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 = 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑗(𝑡) (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 32) 
In the opposite case, when  
(𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 − 𝑒𝑞_𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖(𝑡)) ⋅ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡) ≤   𝐵𝑖(𝑡), (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 33) 
the rest is raised by credit: 
𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑗(𝑡)  =  𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑗(𝑡)  +  𝑚𝑎𝑥(0,𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 − 𝑒𝑞_𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖(𝑡)) (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 34)  
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𝐸𝑗(𝑡) =  𝐸𝑗(𝑡) − 𝑚𝑎𝑥(0,𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 − 𝑒𝑞_𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖(𝑡))
⋅ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡)                                                                                            (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 35) 
𝐵𝑖(𝑡) =  𝐵𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑚𝑎𝑥(0,𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 − 𝑒𝑞_𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖(𝑡))
⋅ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡)                                                                                            (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 36) 
In the case the firm does not sell any equity (𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗(𝑡)  ≤  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛_𝑜𝑛_𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖(𝑡)), steps 
(𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 27) − (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 36)  are not executed. Finally, in both cases, we account for the too big credit 
rates, like we did in (𝐴. 𝑣. 22) − (𝐴. 𝑣. 23): 
 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗 > 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵𝑖 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 37) 
𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 = 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑗 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 38) 
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙 ⋅ 𝐵𝑖 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 37′) 
𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 = max(0, 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑗 − (1 − 𝜙)𝐵𝑖) (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 38
′) 
 
 
If the bank raises capital (𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 > 0 – now it can also denote the capital dilution, it is just an amount 
the bank needs for financing its investments), it selects the bank with the best proposal too, and the 
transaction is conducted as follows: 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑘𝑗(𝑡) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑘𝑗(𝑡) + (𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 − 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑗) (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 39) 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑗𝑘(𝑡) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑗𝑘(𝑡) − (𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 − 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑗) (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 40) 
𝑙𝑒𝑣′𝑝 =
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝(𝑡) + ∑ max (0, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑝𝑖(𝑡))𝑖
𝐸𝑝(𝑡)
, ∀𝑝 ∈ 1, … , 𝐵𝑘 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 41) 
𝐸𝑘(𝑡) = 𝐸𝑘(𝑡) + 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖 ⋅ (1 + 𝜓𝑘 ⋅ tanh(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑗
′)) ⋅ (𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 − 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑗) (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 42) 
𝐸𝑗(𝑡) = 𝐸𝑗(𝑡) − 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖 ⋅ (1 + 𝜓𝑘 ⋅ tanh(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑗
′)) ⋅ (𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 − 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑗) (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 43) 
𝐸𝑗(𝑡) = 𝐸𝑗(𝑡) + 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑗 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 44) 
𝐸𝑘(𝑡) = 𝐸𝑘(𝑡) − 𝑡𝑎𝑥_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑗𝑑 ⋅ (𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 − 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑗) − 𝑡𝑎𝑥_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑗𝑒
⋅ 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑡𝑜_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑗                                                                                                    (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 45) 
And then we update the following variables, as we did previously: 
𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑗(𝑡) + 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 46) 
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑗(𝑡) + 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 47) 
𝐹𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 𝐹𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 48) 
After all the credits are given and taken, we update the liquidity: 
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𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗(𝑡) =  𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗(𝑡) +∑𝐹𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑖
𝑖
+∑(𝑒𝑞𝑗𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑒𝑞𝑗𝑖(𝑡 − 1)) ⋅ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖
𝑖
, ∀𝑗 ∈ 1, . . , 𝐼                  (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖. 49) 
𝐸𝑓 and 𝐸𝑏 are updated in this step. 
iii. Adjustments in firms and banks accounting 
Nothing changes comparing to the sections (III.A.ix – III.A.xii), except for the dividend payments: 
firms and banks owners not necessarily hold 100% shares of their enterprises. So, we adjust for the 
firm's equation (𝐴. 𝑖𝑥. 5): 
𝑃𝐴𝐽+𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑃𝐴𝐽+𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑑𝑖𝑣 ⋅ 𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡)⏟      
𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖
⋅ (1 − 𝑒𝑞_𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖(𝑡))⏞            
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟
 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖𝑖. 1) 
Firms also pay dividends to the banks holding their shares: 
𝑝𝑖𝐵𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑝𝑖𝐵𝑗(𝑡) + 𝑑𝑖𝑣 ⋅ 𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡) ⋅ 𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑗(𝑡), 𝑖 ∈ 1, … , 𝐼, 𝑗 ∈ 1,… , 𝐵𝑘 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖𝑖. 2) 
Firms defaults are the same, except for adding up equation describing banks losing their shares. If the 
firm 𝑖 defaults, then: 
𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑗(𝑡) = 0, 𝑗 ∈ 1,… , 𝐵𝑘 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖𝑖. 3) 
Like with the loans, firm owners are willing to buy back their equity. If 𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡) > 0, and if 
𝜅 ⋅ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡) ≤ 𝑃𝐴𝐽+𝑖(𝑡), (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖𝑖. 4) 
(i.e., if the firm holder 𝑖 can pay for a 𝜅 share of the company) then it either buys back all the rest of 
the company (if the share not belonging to the firm owner is less than 𝜅) or 𝜅 share: 
𝑃𝐴𝐽+𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑃𝐴𝐽+𝑖(𝑡) − min(𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑗(𝑡), 𝜅) ⋅ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡), 𝑗 ∈ 1,… , 𝐵𝑘 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖𝑖. 5) 
𝐸𝑗(𝑡) = 𝐸𝑗(𝑡) + min(𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑗(𝑡), 𝜅) ⋅ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡), 𝑗 ∈ 1,… , 𝐵𝑘 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖𝑖. 6) 
𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑗(𝑡) = max(𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑗(𝑡) − 𝜅, 0) , 𝑗 ∈ 1, … , 𝐵𝑘 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖𝑖. 7) 
Banks do the same. We amend the (𝐴. 𝑥𝑖. 2) for the dividends to other holders and include equation 
describing payments to them: 
𝑃𝐴𝐽+𝐼+𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑃𝐴𝐽+𝐼+𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑑𝑖𝑣 ⋅ 𝑝𝑖𝐵𝑖(𝑡) ⋅ (1 − 𝑒𝑞_𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑𝐵𝑖(𝑡)) (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖𝑖. 8) 
𝑝𝑖𝐵𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑝𝑖𝐵𝑗(𝑡) + 𝑑𝑖𝑣 ⋅ 𝑝𝑖𝐵𝑖(𝑡) ⋅ 𝑒𝑞𝐵𝑖𝑗(𝑡), 𝑖 ∈ 1,… , 𝐼, 𝑗 ∈ 1,… , 𝐵𝑘 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖𝑖. 9) 
Banks do buybacks in the same fashion, as firms. If 𝑝𝑖𝐵𝑖(𝑡) > 0, and if 
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𝜅 ⋅ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝐵𝑖(𝑡) ≤ 𝐸𝑖(𝑡), (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖𝑖. 10) 
(i.e., if the bank 𝑖 has enough equity to pay for a 𝜅 share of itself) then it either buys back all the rest 
of the bank (if the share not belonging to the bank owner is less than 𝜅) or 𝜅 share: 
𝐸𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐸𝑖(𝑡) − min(𝑒𝑞𝐵𝑖𝑗(𝑡), 𝜅) ⋅ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝐵𝑖(𝑡), 𝑗 ∈ 1,… , 𝐵𝑘 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖𝑖. 5) 
𝐸𝑗(𝑡) = 𝐸𝑗(𝑡) + min(𝑒𝑞𝐵𝑖𝑗(𝑡), 𝜅) ⋅ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝐵𝑖(𝑡), 𝑗 ∈ 1,… , 𝐵𝑘 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖𝑖. 6) 
𝑒𝑞𝐵𝑖𝑗(𝑡) = max(𝑒𝑞𝐵𝑖𝑗(𝑡) − 𝜅, 0) , 𝑗 ∈ 1,… , 𝐵𝑘 (𝐶. 𝑖𝑖𝑖. 7) 
In the case of bank defaults, its equity in firms and other banks is distributed among other shareholders 
proportional to their shares. We do not disclose this mechanism here more precisely, because after 
banks defaults the simulation stops anyway. 
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IV.  Results 
A. Taxation schemes comparison 
In this section, we present the results of the simulation for the taxation schemes comparison. 
In this table initial values of non-temporary variables used are presented: 
Variable Initial value  
𝑇 500 
𝜏 0.05 
𝑑𝑖𝑣 0.2 
𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖 0.02 
𝜁 Different values; a point for comparison. 
𝐼 100 
𝐴𝑖(1) 1 
𝐿𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖(1) 0 
𝑌𝑖(0), 𝑌𝑖(1) 0 
𝐷𝑒𝑖(1) 1 
𝑄𝑖(1) 0 
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒(1) 1 
𝑃𝑖(1) 1 
𝑝𝑖𝑖(1) 0 
𝑤𝑏 1 
𝛼 0.1 
𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖(1) 𝐴𝑖(1) + 10 
𝐽 1300 
𝑃𝐴𝑖(1) 0 
𝑧 2 
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖(1) Uniform integer between 1 and 𝐵𝑘 
𝑂𝑐𝑖 0 
𝑐 0.8 
𝐵𝑘 20 
𝐸𝑖(1) 17.5 
𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑗(1) 10
𝐵𝑘
⋅ 1 
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖(1) ∑𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑗𝑖(1)
𝑗
 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑗(1) 0 
𝐶𝑖(1) 0 
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖(1) Uniform integer between 1 and 𝐵𝑘 
𝑝𝑖𝐵𝑖(1) 0 
𝐶𝑖(1) 0 
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𝐹𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑗 0 
𝑛 5 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 0 
𝜈 0 
𝜙 0.8 
Table 8. Variables initial values 
i. Variables observed 
For analyzing the evolution and death of the simulated economic system following variables are 
considered: 
Variable Initial value  
Loss Sum of all loans given by defaulted banks that are annulled because of 
default events. 
Bad debts Sum of all loans given to defaulted banks. 
Defaults A number of bank defaults in the final step (if simulation stop was caused 
by bank default). 
Time A number of steps system survives before stopping the simulation (i.e. 
before bank default or all the firms are bankrupt, or the number of steps 
exceeds the given threshold). 
Credits Time series of the sum of interbank loans given, characterizing the 
economic activity intensity. 
DebtRanks Time series of DebtRank (next chapter) sums over all the banks. 
Taxes Sum of taxes being levied on the interbank loans. 
Table 9. Observed values 
One should understand the limits of comparability of those values: cumulative values like tax strongly 
depend on the living time of the system. In addition, smaller loss/bad debts/number of defaults or 
greater living time does not imply better policy: one might simply stop any economic activity and enjoy 
the absence of any losses, defaults etc. So, here we have two major criteria, a trade-off between 
sustainability and economic activity. Economic activity is mostly measured via credits and taxes (one 
would not like to levy too much tax) and sustainability is measured via losses, bad debts, numbers of 
defaults, living times of the system and DebtRank sums series. 
ii. The statistical description of the results 
Repeating the simulation 200 times without any taxation, we recorded the state of exposure matrix 
𝐸𝑥𝑝 before the first bank failure, and then plotted a histogram of weighted degree distribution over 
these 200 simulations with 20 banks: 
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 Figure 3. Degrees of the exposure matrix 
 
We have plotted this distribution in order to check visually, whether the model reflects the power law 
common for many real-world networks. Having no preferential attachment feature in the algorithm 
for selecting counterparties, this model does not reflect a very important point in reconstructing real-
world network: networks with degrees distributed by the power law are very sensitive to the central 
nodes’ failures. This could be a point for further improvements to the model.  
 
Figure 4. Losses in logarithmic scales 
Log-log losses over the same simulations also do not reflect any power law. The average loss is ~225. 
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Figure 5. Times 
Average time of the system life without taxation is ~83 steps. 
Having this log-log plot of defaults numbers, we can neither decline nor assume a power law: 
 
Figure 6. Defaults in logarithmic scales 
Maybe, it will be clearer with more simulations. The histogram in linear axes: 
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Figure 7. Defaults in normal axes 
On average, there are ~5 defaults after the first failure. 
Concerning bad debts, the distribution is broad but much more elaborate statistical analysis would be 
needed to confirm whether it follows a power law or not. 
 
Figure 8. Bad debts in logarithmic scales 
On average, bad debt amount constitutes up to ~209. 
For every simulation, we also have a time series of the sum of credits given at every step. If we sum 
this up for every simulation, we will obtain some proxies for economic activity. On the other hand, 
given the variable time of the system’s life, we cannot compare them directly. In order to be able to 
do this, we divide the sum of every credit by the time of the system’s life, thus obtaining a “credit-per-
step” value. Here we observe a thin-tailed distribution: 
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Figure 9. Credits per step in logarithmic scales 
Average credits per step sum are 44.1728. 
We measure risk in the system via the sum of DebtRanks of every bank; so, this sum has an upper 
bound of 𝐵𝑘 = 20. 
 
Figure 10. DebtRanks sums in one plot 
We can observe that this value is mostly growing, and it is difficult to compare this for different 
taxation schemes, because of different living times of systems. We will grasp the last values before the 
failure for every simulation and compare their distributions: 
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Figure 11. Final DebtRanks distribution 
iii. Systemic risk tax check 
In this section, we check the validity of the systemic risk tax proposal: is it Pareto-effective compared 
to others (improving one group of metrics without spoiling others). Losses with systemic risk tax are 
distributed better: 
 
Figure 12. Losses for SRT check in logarithmic scales 
Times of the system’s life do not change much: 
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Figure 13. Times for SRT check 
A number of defaults distribution shows us tails being much thinner with systemic risk tax: 
 
Figure 14. Defaults for SRT check 
Bad debts (what is actually measured by DebtRank, so, SRT levies exactly these expected values) differ 
for all three schemes, being much less catastrophic with the systemic risk tax introduced: 
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Figure 15. Bad debts for SRT check 
 
Here we compare average credits volumes per step. This is where we visually can see a big difference 
between Pigouvian and Tobin taxes. This difference means, that systemic risk tax does not affect the 
economic activity much: 
 
Figure 16. Credits per time step for SRT check in logarithmic scales 
And now we compare taxation volumes per step – here we notice, that systemic risk tax is also much 
smaller than Tobin tax: 
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Figure 17. Tax per time step for SRT check 
Final DebtRanks distributions demonstrate less default exposure in the systems developing with the 
systemic risk tax: 
 
Figure 18. Final DebtRanks distributions for SRT check 
Final degrees distributions (in log-log axes): 
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Figure 19. Degrees for SRT check in logarithmic scales 
Degrees in normal axes: 
 
Figure 20. Degrees for SRT check in linear scales 
We can notice, that both taxes slightly decrease the number of high-degree nodes in approximately 
the same quantities. 
iv. SinkRank parameter search 
Taxation 
scheme 
Mean 
loss 
Mean 
time 
Mean bad 
debts 
Mean 
taxes 
Mean 
defaults 
Mean 
credits 
volumes 
Acyclic 
DebtRank, 
𝜁 = 0.02 
42.3122 89.14 65.5409 0.0235 2.7433 43.4818 
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SinkRank, 𝜁 =
0.08 
210.6515 86.51 187.1199 8.7139e-
04 
5.8800 41.0362 
SinkRank, 𝜁 =
0.16 
172.6679 84.24 159.4879 0.0017 5.2400 40.3624 
SinkRank, 𝜁 =
0.24 
200.3017 85.74 183.7537 0.0023 5.9600 39.9972 
SinkRank, 𝜁 =
0.32 
193.3747 84.57 166.2605 0.0039 5.2800 40.5305 
Tobin, 𝜁 =
0.002 
142.4003 91.8367 121.7794 0.0592 4.3933 34.4758 
No tax, 𝜁 = 0 234.9117 83.7700  207.1787 0 6.3467 44.0656 
Table 10. SinkRank parameter search average results  
   
   
Table 11. SinkRank parameter search main plots 
At 𝜁 = 0.16 losses are slightly decreased by SinkRank taxation. 
Based on living times, we cannot conclude on the SinkRank tax impact. Even DebtRank with this 𝜁 
does not show much greater mean value, however, it changes the distribution much.  
Bad debts distributions are not affected much by SinkRank tax, which slightly cuts tail; unlike Tobin 
and DebtRank tax, which significantly decrease bad debts. Mean values are still decreased by SinkRank 
tax, 𝜁 = 0.16 is the best performing one. 
Taxes distributions of SinkRank are of a significantly different shape compared to Tobin and 
DebtRank tax. On average, they are much less than both Tobin and DebtRank taxes.   
Defaults distributions are neither much affected by the SinkRank nor Tobin tax unlike DebtRank tax 
cutting the tail of the number of defaults distribution. On average, SinkRank also performs worse than 
even Tobin tax (𝜁 = 0.16 also is the best selection for the SinkRank): 
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The economic activity being measured by average credits given per step is almost not affected by 
SinkRank taxes. On average, SinkRank also performs much better than Tobin tax and slightly worse 
than DebtRank. 
Overall, we select 𝜁 = 0.16 for the further comparison of the SinkRank tax. However, based on a 
“peak” point in the performance – for greater 𝜁 we can obtain more bad debts – we can already 
conclude about the inefficiency of the SinkRank for the systemic risk tax purpose. 
v. 2-step DebtRank parameter search 
Taxation scheme Mean 
loss 
Mean 
time 
Mean bad 
debts 
Mean 
taxes 
Mean 
defaults 
Mean 
credits 
volumes 
Acyclic DebtRank, 
𝜁 = 0.02 
42.3122 89.1433 65.5409 0.0235 2.7433 43.4818 
2-step DebtRank, 
𝜁 = 0.015 
44.5122 92.9850 50.9328 0.0358 2.3050 34.5564 
2-step DebtRank, 
𝜁 = 0.02 
49.4606 90.7900 48.7891 0.0399 2.4750 32.9865 
2-step DebtRank, 
𝜁 = 0.04 
26.4562 95.8750 27.7202 0.0482 1.6800 29.4462 
2-step DebtRank, 
𝜁 = 0.08 
15.8857 111.0550 22.4461 0.0549 1.7050 25.8669 
Tobin, 𝜁 = 0.002 142.4003 91.8367 121.7794 0.0592 4.3933 34.4758 
No tax, 𝜁 = 0 234.9117 83.7700  207.1787 0 6.3467 44.0656 
Table 12. 2-step DebtRank parameter search average results 
   
   
Table 13. 2-step DebtRank parameter search main plots 
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Unlike SinkRank, 2-step DebtRank decreases losses, bad debts and defaults numbers with 𝜁 increase. 
Overall, 2-step DebtRank behaviour is similar to the original DebtRank, so, based on the credit 
volumes being close to the Tobin tax we select 𝜁 = 0.015 for the further comparison.  
Surprisingly, with smaller 𝜁 2-step DebtRank average tax is greater, than with the original DebtRank, 
however, having a complex evolving system, there might be different  less straightforward 
explanations for this phenomenon. 
vi. Acyclic DebtRank vs. Cyclic DebtRank 
Taxation scheme Mean 
loss 
Mean 
time 
Mean bad 
debts 
Mean 
taxes 
Mean 
defaults 
Mean 
credits 
volumes 
Acyclic DebtRank, 
𝜁 = 1 
4.5638 129.2000 4.9706 0.0150 1.3733 13.2938 
Cyclic DebtRank, 
𝜁 = 1 
4.6630 122.5767 4.3138 0.0149 1.3300 13.4829 
Table 14. Acylic DebtRank vs. Cyclic Debtrank average results 
   
   
Table 15. Acyclic DebtRank vs. Cyclic DebtRank comparison main plots 
In theory, we would suppose better performance of the cyclic DebtRank; in practice, the difference is 
vague, and the average losses amount is slightly less and the living time is greater for the acyclic 
DebtRank. For other mean values, cyclic DebtRank is slightly better, especially for the bad debts we 
can even visually notice the dominance of the cyclic DebtRank. 
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vii. Results 
Taxation scheme Mean 
loss 
Mean 
time 
Mean bad 
debts 
Mean 
taxes 
Mean 
defaults 
Mean 
credits 
volumes 
Acyclic DebtRank, 
𝜁 = 0.02 
42.3122 89.1433 65.5409 0.0235 2.7433 43.4818 
2-step DebtRank, 
𝜁 = 0.015 
44.5122 92.9850 50.9328 0.0358 2.3050 34.5564 
SinkRank, 𝜁 = 0.16 172.6679 84.24 159.4879 0.0017 5.2400 40.3624 
Tobin, 𝜁 = 0.002 142.4003 91.8367 121.7794 0.0592 4.3933 34.4758 
No tax, 𝜁 = 0 234.9117 83.7700  207.1787 0 6.3467 44.0656 
Table 16. Final taxation schemes comparison average results 
   
   
Table 17. Final taxation schemes comparison main plots 
2-step DebtRank performs better than SinkRank for all the distributions (except tax/time, but we 
should consider more credits/time: if SinkRank gathers less tax, but affects the economic activity 
more, than it is ineffective). In addition, SinkRank’s non-monotonicity sets certain limits on its 
applicability. Our primary investigation of SinkRank for the systemic risk taxation shows its 
inappropriateness. 
2-step DebtRank also outperforms Tobin tax and is close to the original DebtRank. We suppose it is 
worth investigating further. 
B. Equity layer investigation 
Variable Initial value  
𝜇 0.2 
𝜎 1 
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𝜇𝐵 0.2 
𝜎𝐵 0.5 
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖(1) 10 
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝐵𝑗(1) 5 
𝜇𝑟𝑜𝑒 0.1 
𝜎𝑟𝑜𝑒 0.05 
𝜇𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑒 0.05 
𝜎𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑒 0.025 
𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑗(1) 0 
𝑒𝑞𝐵𝑖𝑗(1) 0 
𝐸𝑓 0 
𝐸𝑏 0 
𝑒𝑞_𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖 0 
𝑒𝑞_𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑𝐵𝑖 0 
𝜅  0.2 
Table 18. Initial values for the equity layer modelling 
When introducing equity layer, we did not expect any certain results. We obtained the less-living 
system because of the new risky asset (however, this can be tuned by the change in the underlying 
stochastic processes parameters) and greater impact of the systemic risk tax. We also can plot here the 
degree distribution for the equity layer tax (also including bank-firm equity relations). We can notice, 
that here taxes (both Pigouvian and Tobin) increase degrees in opposite of what we observed in 
(IV.A.iii). 
 
   
   
Table 19. Equity layer simulation main plots 
An effect discussed before the implementation concerns the interaction of the layers. On the one 
hand, systemic risk in both layers should be correlated because of the economic activity oscillations: 
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when the economic activity is higher, both layers evolve more thus increasing the systemic risk. On 
the other hand, higher risk in one layer implies higher taxes compared to the other layer thus leading 
to more transactions in the layer with lower tax. Both theories appeared to be correct: average 
DebtRanks sum correlation between layers for 300 simulations with 𝜁 = 0.02 equals 0.662, with a 
minimal value of −0.21; and for the 𝜁 = 1 average correlation equals 0.159 with the minimal 
correlation value of −0.82. Examples of the DebtRanks time series from single simulations are 
presented in the following table: 
DebtRanks vs. time example DebtRanks vs. time example DebtRanks vs. time example 𝜁 
 
  
1 
   
0.02 
Table 20. Examples of DebtRanks time series for 2 different taxation parameter values 
  
Time Time Time 
Time Time Time 
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V. Discussion 
We have replicated the results of the basic paper [6] and brought changes in two directions: 1) tried 
different metrics and 2) implemented a new layer. We have confirmed that systemic risk tax, based on 
DebtRank, can efficiently create stimuli for the agents to restructure the network in a more robust 
way without a significant decrease in transaction volumes.  
The investigated virtual economic system appeared to be very complex, and the result of the direct 
impact of the tax on the metrics it is based on is very impressive. The economy does not always 
response to the external stimuli the way it is expected. For instance, tax increase under certain 
conditions may decrease the volume of taxes delivered to the government because of the Laffer curve 
underlying reasons [25] or because of the squeezing businesses to the shadow sector of the economy. 
In the light of these considerations, the result of really working (at least, in simulations) systemic risk 
tax pointwise influencing the complex system, is something worth attention. 
We have come to the conclusion that metrics calculating expected losses in a distressed network are 
suited better for the purpose of the systemic risk tax. Moreover, we can also suppose, that the tax 
based on a certain metric will first improve this metric in the system. So, if instead of bad debts 
measured by DebtRanks, one would propose a routine that would calculate losses (in a sense of 
chapter IV) or the number of consequent defaults, then the tax based on this metric would better 
perform for this metric maybe conceding to, e.g., DebtRank in bad debts. In this case, it might be 
worth considering, for instance, linear combinations of taxes aimed at certain metrics. 
We also have tested a very different systemic risk metric, SinkRank. It appeared to show a non-
monotonicity in response to the increase of the fraction of it to be taxed. So, this could be an example 
of a totally inappropriate systemic risk metric: if we consider a degree centrality (which leads to the 
Tobin taxation scheme), we do not obtain this result. Instead, for the degree centrality, we have a 
trade-off between economic activity and the system’s robustness. 
We have considered the illegality of such taxation and proposed the truncated version of the 
DebtRank, involving only neighbours and neighbours of the neighbours of the counterparties. The 
tax, based on these values, has shown great performance, being close to the original DebtRank. This 
result appears to be intuitively surprising, and we suppose that this metric performance may depend 
too much on the network topology. We assume that for the power-law degree distribution of the 
credit network results may change dramatically. Anyway, we have shown that there might be fruitful 
results in this area. 
The agent-based model used, despite having fair and reasonable assumptions about agents behaviour, 
produces network without power law in degrees distribution, what might be crucial for the 
examination of critical events. We suppose that it worth adjusting this model to produce scale-free 
credit networks. While this model is quite complex and temporal, one cannot explicitly define the 
desired network to be produced, however, other topology metrics influence might also be interesting 
to investigate. For example, higher clustering may lead to the dominance of cyclic DebtRank over the 
acyclic one, and smaller average shortest paths may lead to a greater number of defaults. We would 
propose to start with the degree distribution, implicitly inserting a preferential attachment mechanism 
at the stage of firm-bank loans: banks select their counterparties among all of the existing banks, while 
firms send applications only to a certain number of randomly chosen banks. Instead of the uniform 
distribution, one could try the probabilities proportional to some balance sheet quantities of the banks. 
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When implementing an equity layer, the biggest problem was the modelling of market values. We tried 
to imitate the real business valuation processes via DCF’s: we know all the book and historical values 
about all the banks and firms to evaluate them, however, this method did not help us to create a 
developing system. Anyway, we do not deny the possibility of such modelling fashion. In addition, 
such an implicit valuation would be harder to tune, for instance, in case of attempts to fit this model 
to the real data. 
Instead, we have chosen an easier way to model market values as stochastic processes. We did not 
produce any substantially new results except the multilayer risk oscillation under the systemic risk tax. 
For the more detailed investigation, one should measure systemic risk not after every simulation cycle, 
but after every transaction in order to consider correlations with unitary lag. 
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